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I. INTRODUCTION
Luz Marina Silva, a political activist in Colombia, began to
receive anonymous phone calls threatening to kill her if she did not
stop her political activities. One day, an anonymous shooter
attempted to take her life, narrowly missing her. More anonymous
phone calls came after the shooting, saying they would not miss her
next time. She feared she would be killed if she did not stop her
political activities, and fled the country as a refugee and filed for
asylum in the U.S.' The United States offers protection to refugees
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Law. I would like to thank Professor Rebecca Sharpless for her guidance in research
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fleeing persecution on account of political opinion, and it would
seem that in many ways Silva was a good candidate for political
asylum. However, her asylum application was denied, not because
her story was not credible, but because she could not conclusively
prove that the motives of the anonymous shooter were political. A
number of cases have arisen in the U.S. circuit courts addressing
similar scenarios, producing different approaches in the way these
cases should be treated.
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Convention) defines refugees as persons fleeing their country
because of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, social
group, or political opinion. U.S. Asylum law is directly based off of
the Convention, and adopts the same language.3 Applicants must be
able to show a nexus between the persecution and one of these
protected grounds in order to qualify as refugees (the nexus
requirement). This inevitably requires that the applicant show the
motivations of their persecutors. One problem, however, is that
attackers rarely introduce themselves and explain their motives to
their victims, particularly when the persecutors are private parties. In
these cases, asylum applicants are forced to use circumstantial
evidence to show that persecution was on account of a protected
ground. When an applicant cannot definitively prove motivation,
what should courts require by way of evidence?
The Eleventh and Third Circuits have a higher standard for
proving the nexus requirement than the Ninth Circuit. Not knowing
the identity of the attacker appears to be a nearly insurmountable
problem for applicants in the Eleventh and Third Circuits, whereas
applicants in the Ninth Circuit may still be able to establish the nexus
requirement. Which approach is more faithful to U.S. asylum law and
the 1951 Convention as amended by the 1967 Protocol (Protocol)?
And what sources of law can inform this process? This article argues
that the Ninth Circuit approach is more faithful to the intent of the
1 Silva v. Attorney General, 448 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11 th Cir. 2006).
2 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6260, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention].
3 Elizabeth A. James, Comment: Is the U.S. Fulfilling Its Obligations Under the
1951 Refugee Convention? The Colombian Crisis in Context. 33 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 455, 476 (2008)
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Immigration and Nationality Act and to the Convention. Even
though the burden is on the applicant to prove her case, the burden
of proof should not require the applicant to produce evidence that is
impossible to obtain.
Just as important as the burden of proof is the standard of
review on appeal, which greatly affects a judge's ability to decide a
case. Whether the finding is characterized as an issue of fact or an
issue of law determines how much deference will be accorded to the
Immigration Judge's findings. Judges give great deference to findings
of fact, yet review issues of law de novo. The majority of circuit courts,
including the Eleventh Circuit, assume that an Immigration Judge's
finding of the nexus requirement is an issue of fact, but this article
argues that in some instances it is more appropriate to treat it as an
issue of law, as some Ninth Circuit opinions illustrate. The Eleventh
Circuit, by giving deference to "findings of fact" made by
Immigration Judges, have in fact refused to address serious errors of
law.
One must turn to the language of INA § 101(a)(42) to see
what the appropriate standard is. However, since U.S. asylum law is
based off of the Convention, international sources of law should also
be taken into account. Furthermore, this article looks to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook
(Handbook)4 for guidance on how the Convention should be
interpreted. The reading most consistent with the Convention, U.S.
asylum law, and the Handbook is that an applicant should not be
required to know the identity of an attacker in order to satisfy the
nexus requirement. Before turning to this problem, however, a brief
overview of the relevant Convention provisions and U.S. asylum law
is necessary.
4 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees (Jan. 1992) [Hereinafter Handbook], available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3314.html.
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II. BACKGROUND: CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES AND THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
The Convention defines a refugee as "any person who ...
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside his country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country." 5 In 1968, the United States became party
to the Convention as amended by the Protocol, and Congress made
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980 (INA).6 INA § 101(a)
defines a refugee as a person who is outside of such person's country
of nationality and cannot return "because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . .. .7
The difference between the definition of refugee in INA § 101(a) and
the Convention is that Congress added past persecution as a basis for
being a refugee, whereas the Convention only speaks of a "well
founded fear" of persecution.' Under the convention, past persecu-
tion would be relevant personal experience tending to establish a
well-founded fear of persecution as well,9 but U.S. Asylum law
specifically states that "An applicant who has been found to have
established such past persecution shall also be presumed to have a
well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim." 10
This definition raises several questions concerning who
qualifies for refugee status. One important question is what consti-
tutes persecution. Courts have distinguished "mere harassment"
from persecution:
5 Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
6 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102; see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211
(B.I.A. 1985) ("[W]e note that Congress added the elements in the definition of a
refugee to our law by means of the Refugee Act of 1980 .... In so doing Congress
intended to conform the Immigration and Nationality Act to the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ... .
7 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
8 See Mahsa Aliaskari, U.S. Asylum Law Applied to Battered Women Fleeing Islamic
Countries, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 231, 234 n. 11 (2000).
9 Handbook, supra note 4, para 41.
'0 8 C.F.R. 208.13(b)(1) (2010).
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Although the INA does not expressly define "perse-
cution" for purposes of qualifying as a "refugee," see 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) . . . "persecution" is an "extreme
concept," requiring "more than a few isolated inci-
dents of verbal harassment or intimidation," and that
"[mlere harassment does not amount to persecu-
tion." I1
For instance, threatening messages or phone calls, even death threats,
normally do not rise to the level of persecution. 2 However, an alien
need not experience persecution in order to qualify as a refugee. Even
in the absence of past persecution, a person may be able to show a
well-founded fear of future persecution if the fear is reasonable.
1 3
The agents of persecution are also an important aspect of a
claim to asylum. Normally persecution comes from the government,
but in some instances persecution may come from the population
itself: "Where serious discriminatory or other offensive acts are
committed by the local populace, they can be considered as
persecution if they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if
the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection." 14
Where a nongovernmental actor is the agent of persecution, an
applicant for asylum must also show that the situation is pervasive
throughout the country, and relocating to another area in the same
country would change the circumstances. If the government is the
persecutor, it is presumed that the persecution is pervasive
throughout the country.
1 Sepulveda v. United States Attorney General, 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir.
2005) (citing Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (1 1th Cir. 2000)); see also
Handbook, supra n. 4, para 51-53.
12 See, e.g., Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Threats standing alone.
. . constitute past persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when the
threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm."); see also
Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231.
13 "These considerations need not necessarily be based on the applicant's own
personal experience. What for example, happened to his friend and relatives and
other members of the same racial or social group may well show that his fear that
sooner or later he also will become a victim of persecution is well-founded."
Handbook, supra note 4, para. 42.
14 Handbook, supra note 4, para. 65.
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The burden of proof has always laid with the alien seeking
refugee status. 15 In 2005, however, the Real ID Act added the
following statutory provision:
The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish
that the applicant is a refugee, within the meaning of
section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title. To establish that the
applicant is a refugee within the meaning of such sec-
tion, the applicant must establish that race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion was or will be at least one central
reason for persecuting the applicant. 16
Even though it was already understood that the burden of proof lay
on the applicant, this provision explicitly states that the applicant
must show that there is a nexus between the persecution and one of
the five related grounds.
What if the victim does not know the specific identity of the
individual persecutor? Is there any way to prove that there is a nexus
between the persecution and one of the five protected grounds?
Return to the scenario of Silva described at the beginning of this
article regarding the anonymous shooter. There is no question that
such an attack rises to the level of persecution. However, if it occurs
without any other evidence to suggest that it was motivated by one
of the five protected grounds, the applicant cannot prove that she
falls within the definition of a refugee under the Convention. More
proof would be needed to show that the persecution was because of
one of the five protected grounds. But if there are, as in Silva's case,
other incidents of discrimination motivated by one of the protected
grounds, perhaps not in themselves amounting to persecution, but
suggesting that the anonymous attack was also linked to that
protected ground, can the applicant prove past persecution on
"5 "Case law and the regulations have always made clear that it is the alien who bears
the burden of proving that he would be subject to, or fears, persecution." Matter of
Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 215 (B.I.A. 1985); see also Handbook, supra note 4, para.
197 ("It is a general legal principle that the burden of proof lies on the person
submitting a claim.").
16 8 U.S.C. 1 158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
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account of political opinion? Or does the applicant have a well
founded fear of future persecution? In addition to these facts, add a
third factor: what if the immigrant comes from a country where there
is civil war or where violence is a common occurrence? Does this
help the applicant's case, or hurt it?
Although this scenario may seem like a very narrow set of
facts, this situation is not uncommon in countries experiencing
violent conflicts. The Eleventh and Third Circuits, for instance, have
denied asylum claims like this one on review from the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA). The Eleventh Circuit decisions, most
notably in Silva v. Attorney General1 7and Sepulveda v. Attorney
General,8 suggest that in a country where violence is the norm, an
asylum applicant has a heavier burden to show that the reason for
the persecution was because of a protected ground. The Ninth Circuit
in some cases, as in Aguilera-Cota v. INS,19 have taken a different
approach, not requiring the applicant to prove definitively the reason
for the persecution in order to satisfy the nexus requirement.
III. U.S. CIRCUIT COURTS DECISIONS: DIFFERENT APPROACHES
Two notable cases illustrate the Eleventh Circuit's approach
to the scenario described above, namely, Sepulveda v. Attorney
General2 ° and Silva v. Attorney General.21 As both of these cases con-
cern asylum applicants from Colombia, a brief background of the
Colombian country conditions is helpful to understand the context of
these cases. Luis Alberto Restrepo writes, "The majority of the
Colombian population has become accustomed to viewing human
rights violations as endemic occurrences or as natural disasters, as
normal as landslides or earthquakes." 22 In Colombia, most asylum
applicants claim political persecution,2 3 however, the government is
1 448 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2006).
18 401 F.3d 1226 (11 th Cir. 2005).
'9 14 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1990).
20 401 F.3d 1226 (11 th Cir. 2005).
2 448 F.3d 1229 (llth Cir. 2006)
22 Luis Alberto Restrepo, The Equivocal Dimensions of Human Rights in Colombia,
in VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 1990-2000, 96 (Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Pefiaranda,
Gonzalo Sdnchez G., eds., 2001).
2 448 F.3d at 1235.
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not always the persecutor. Various guerrilla groups, such as the
Armed Revolutionary Forces of Columbia (FARC), or the National
Liberation Army (ELN), use brutal methods to achieve their political
goals.24 U.S. courts have found that these guerilla groups are so
pervasive throughout Colombia, that internal relocation is not con-
sidered a viable option for those fleeing persecution from them.
25
According to the Colombia Profile of Asylum Claims and Country
Conditions, asylum applicants in Colombia often "express uncer-
tainty about the identity and/or motivation of their alleged
abusers." 26 These circumstances have created some problems for
asylum applicants from Colombia and other countries where such
violence is common.
In Sepulveda v. Attorney General, the asylum applicant believed
that she was a target of persecution because "her pro-democracy
ideology conflicts with that of the ELN guerilla group. 27 Sepulveda
belonged to a University group that organized peace marches and
also helped negotiations between the families of people who had
been kidnapped and the kidnappers. The method that the group used
to communicate was through mailboxes that the group set up at
several restaurants, at one of which Sepulveda worked.28 After she
started helping with the negotiations, she began receiving threat-
ening phone calls from members of the ELN. The callers explicitly
told her to stop her peace activities and threatened to kill her.29 After
she finished one of her shifts at the restaurant, a bomb was placed in
the mailbox set up by the University group. Although she did not
know the identity of the person who placed the bomb there, she
believed it was one of the ELN members because of the phone calls
and her involvement in the negotiations.
30
25 401 F.3d at 1232, n. 7. ("The 1999 and 2000 Country Reports... make clear that
guerillas exercise influence throughout Colombia, and that small and large munici-
palities are already overwhelmed by the huge populations of displaced persons, who
are consequently without access to health care, education, or employment.")
26 id.
27 Id. at 1229.
28 id.
29 id.
30 Id
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With regard to the bombing, the court noted that "[a]Ithough
the evidence may permit a conclusion the restaurant bombing was
directed at Sepulveda on account of her political activity, it does not
compel such a conclusion."3t The threatening phone calls, while the
court agreed they were directed at her on account of her political
opinion, did not rise to the level of persecution.32 The court con-
sidered each incident individually, yet did not seem to take into
account the larger picture and consider all the facts taken together in
determining whether the nexus requirement was satisfied. It seems
more likely than not that the bomb, which was placed in the mailbox
set up by the University group specifically for the negotiations, was
directed against the University group, especially when this incident
is considered in light of the death threats from ELN members.
Perhaps an even more compelling case was that of Luz
Marina Silva, which was heard on appeal the next year by the
Eleventh Circuit in Silva v. Attorney General.33 Silva belonged to a
politically active family with connections to the conservative party,
and she "participated in 'health brigades' or 'help brigades,' which
were groups of people that traveled into neighborhoods and offered
the residents of those neighborhoods health services to encourage the
support of the Visionary Party." During the second campaign, Silva
received a death threat in the form of a "condolence note" signed by
the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) in September of 1999,
stating "Luz Marina Silva Rest in peace for doing what she shouldn't
be doing in the wrong place." After this incident she began to receive
anonymous threatening phone calls. 34 Three weeks after receiving the
death threat signed by the FARC, two unidentified men on
motorcycles followed her home and shot at her. Although she was
uninjured, she stated that the shots missed her "by very little," and
the back window of her car was shattered.35 She received another
anonymous call that night warning her not to report the incident. She
31 id.
321d. at 1231.
33 448 F.3d 1229 (11 th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1234. One phone call stated that Silva "was a target because her family 'had
always exploited the Colombian people."' However, the majority found it significant
that "Silva did not testify that any of the calls mentioned her politics." Id.
35 Jd.at 1245-46, (Carnes, J., dissenting).
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stopped all political activities after this incident, and did not receive
any more anonymous threats. She left for the United States one
month later, and thinking it would be safe to return, she came back to
Colombia in January of 200, where she began to receive more anony-
mous threatening phone calls, stating "we are not going to miss a
,36
second time, we're going to kill you." She came to the United States
two months later, and filed for asylum.
The Immigration Judge denied her claim for asylum, stating
that "everybody in Colombia suffers under these general conditions
of violence and criminal activity," and the BIA affirmed.37 The
Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Pryor, affirmed the
BIA.
As in Sepulveda, the Eleventh Circuit Court seemed to take
apart the evidence piece-meal. The threatening phone calls were not
on account of a political activity because they were anonymous, even
though the calls were directed at her participation in the "health
brigades." The court admitted that the first "condolence note" signed
by the FARC was on account of her political activity, but it did not
rise to the level of persecution.38 The shooting, on the other hand,
while sufficient to rise to the level of persecution, was not proved to
be on account of political opinion. Judge Pryor, writing for the
majority, stated,
the shooting incident, for which Silva had no
explanation, did not distinguish her from the majority
of Colombians who are also subject to the general
conditions of violence and criminal activity in
Colombia. Both the Colombian Country Report and
the Country Profile are replete with descriptions of
widespread and indiscriminate violence."
39
Although the court admitted that a different conclusion could be
reached if it were reviewing the case de novo, the court stressed that
that it must review the Immigration Judge's findings of fact under the
36 Id. at 1234.
37Id. at 1235.
38 Id. at 1237.
39 1d. at 1238.
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highly deferential "substantial evidence test."40 Under this test, a
finding of fact cannot be reversed unless there the evidence compels
such a conclusion. The court concluded by stating that "when we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding of the
Immigration Judge, the record does not compel the conclusion that
Silva suffered political persecution." 41 The court assumes that an
Immigration Judge's finding that the nexus requirement has not been
satisfied is a finding of fact rather than a finding of law.
Judge Carnes in his dissent argued that the evidence was
compelling that the shooting was connected to the FARC, since the
FARC had just three weeks earlier threatened to kill her in the
"condolence note," and she had continued her political activities. 42
The anonymous phone calls, Judge Carnes' argued, did mention her
political activity because they told her to stop her participation in the
"health brigades," and they clearly referenced the shootings, creating
a very strong inference that FARC was behind all of the incidents.
Carnes' most stinging critique of the majority concerned its emphasis
on the fact that Silva did not know the identity of the shooters:
True enough, the would-be assassins did not stop to
introduce themselves. They rarely do. It is not realistic
to expect the targets of political assassinations to
know the identity of the gunmen who shoot at them.
Only in the majority's imagination do would be
killers wear name tags or drive around on motor-
cycles with vanity plates displaying the name of their
terrorist organization.
43
Judge Carnes in his dissent also took a different view
concerning how general conditions of violence should affect an
applicant's burden of proof:
"[Tihe widespread nature of violence in a country is
not a legitimate reason for denying asylum to a prac-
4 0 d. at 1236.
41 Id. at 1239.
42 Id. at 1246 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
43 Id. (Canes, J., dissenting).
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titioner who establishes that she has been persecuted
within the meaning of 101(a)(42(A) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act .... The fact that there is
also indiscriminate violence is no reason for refusing
to recognize violence and persecution on grounds
that are specifically listed in our immigration laws.44
Judge Carnes did not argue that there was any error of law, which
would have caused the court to review the case under a less
deferential standard. In the dissenting opinion's view, although there
was no irrefutable proof that the gunmen were from FARC, the
inference was so compelling, as a matter of fact, that the BIA's
decision should have been reversed.
The Third Circuit used a similar approach as the Eleventh
Circuit in Skendaj v. Attorney General.45 Skendaj and his family
received anonymous threatening phone calls, which, according to his
wife, were "on account of the political opinion of her father, a high
ranking member of the Albanian Democratic Party. " 46 The court in
Skendaj found that the anonymous telephone calls, although on
account of political poinion, did not rise to the level of persecution.
47
However, when the Skendaj family went in a taxicab to visit the
father who was part of the Albanian Democratic Party, two
unidentified men on motorcycles attempted to kidnap their child
through the window, although the taxicab driver sped up to avoid
them.4 s
The court found that the attempted kidnapping was not
persecution on account of a protected ground. As in Silva, the court in
Skendaj found it significant that the men on motorcycles were
anonymous: "Neither Skendaj nor his wife were able to identify the
kidnappers, the kidnappers did not make any reference to the
Skendajs' political opinion, the Skendajs did not report the incident to
44 Id. at 1248 (Carnes, J., Dissenting).
45 No. 08-2928, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19760 (3d Cir. Sep. 1, 2009).
46 Id. at *750.
47 id.
48 id.
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the police, and they did not experience further threats or confronta-
tions.
49
Although a reasonable inference could be made that the
telephone calls and the attempted kidnapping were related, the court
considered the evidence insufficient to establish past persecution. It
seems strange to require the Skandajs to know the identity of the
kidnappers, since for obvious reasons kidnappers prefer to remain
anonymous. It is difficult to imagine how the kidnappers could have
referenced the Skandajs' political opinion, considering they did not
even have time to complete the kidnapping.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit took a different approach in
Garces v. Mukasey5 ° in another case involving a Colombian Refugee.
Garces was involved in FUNDAEMPAZ, an organization in
Colombia that opposed the human rights abuses of the ELN, and
began receiving threatening telephone calls in October of 2001. Four
months later, an unidentified person fired shots at Garces' home, but
5'she was on vacation. The next month, an unidentified woman in a
taxicab, accompanied by a man, pulled up to Garces' home while she
was sitting on the balcony and pointed a gun at her. The cab drove
away after Garces ran back into the house.
52
The Immigration Judge denied the asylum application
"because the death threats Garces received were via telephone and
not acted upon." 53 The Ninth Circuit reversed. The threatening phone
calls alone did not rise to the level of persecution, but the court held
that the incidents involving the shooting of her house and the
pointing of the gun were "close confrontations" sufficient to "compel
49 id.
50 No. 04-70272, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4842 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009).
51 The Court noted the testimony of Garces, who said that she did not conclusively
know who the shooter was, but stated "we had been living at that house for 15 years
and that kind of thing had never happened before, so we felt that it was totally
related to the threats we had received." Id at **8.52 Id. at**1-2.
5I Id. at **4-5 ("The second incident which the respondent described in which she
was seated on the balcony, the assailant never took any action against the
respondent. They simply point[ed] what she thought was a weapon and moved on.
They never took any follow-up actions with regard to the threat.").
2011 245
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
a finding of political persecution within the meaning of the asylum
statute."54 The court noted:
Although the government asserts that there is no
evidence to link ELN's death threats to the incident
where the family home was shot and where the
female assailant pointed a handgun at Garces, we find
that there is a reasonable inference that these inci-
dents are related given their temporal proximity. A
conclusion that these incidents are coincidental or
unrelated is an unreasonable reading of the record.55
The court's statement illustrates its view that it is unnecessary to
know the identity of the attacker in order to satisfy the nexus
requirement. The concluded stated that the record "conclusively
establishes . . . that ELN targeted petitioners because of Garces's
membership in FUNDAEMPAZ."5 6 The court found that Garces in
fact had suffered past persecution, and remanded to the BIA the issue
of whether she had a well founded fear.
The Ninth Circuit similarly ruled on a case involving a
Salvadorian refugee in Aguilera-Cota v. U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv. 7 In this case, Aguilera, a government employee
received an anonymous threatening note with his name on it,
141d. at **,,.
" Id The Court stated that "The government does not contest that these incidents
were .. .politically motivated." Id. at **4, n.3. The government in its brief noted
that the immigration Judge ruled that the applicant did not meet her burden of proof
to show that a separate incident, where she was drugged and abducted in a taxi cab,
was politically motivated, but the government did not make any similar argument
concerning the shooting at the house or the pointing of the gun. Brief for Respondent
at 17, Garces, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19760 (No. 04-70272), 2004 WL 3155049 at
*17. There seems to have been some confusion of the issues, therefore, when the
court stated that the government asserted that there was "no evidence to link ELN's
death threats to the incident where the family home was shot and where the female
assailant pointed a handgun." Garces, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4842, at **11.
Nevertheless, the court's statement illustrates its view that it would be unreasonable
to disregard the circumstantial evidence indicating that the anonymous attackers
were members of ELN, and thus politically motivated.
56 Garces, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19760, at * *11.
17 914 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1990).
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warning him to "quit his job or pay the consequences."58 Shortly after
receiving the note, which Aguilera destroyed, an unidentified man
came to Aguilera's home and "questioned his sister concerning
Aguilera's whereabouts and his job with the government," and stated
that he would return.59 Aguilera fled to the United States and applied
for asylum, but the Immigration Judge denied his application. The
Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Reinhardt, reversed, holding
that it was not necessary to know the identity of the person who
wrote the note or came to his house in order to satisfy the nexus
requirement:
There is nothing novel about the concept that per-
secutors cannot be expected to conform to arbitrary
evidentiary rules established by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service; neither Salvadoran leftists nor
Middle Eastern terrorists, such as members of the
PLO or the Hezbollah, have been given adequate
notice that our government expects them to sign their
names and reveal their individual identities when
60they deliver threatening messages.
Interestingly, the court characterized the lower court's error as an
error of law, rather than an error of fact. In the court's opinion, the
Immigration Judge used an improper and too stringent standard in
assessing Aguilera's testimony to determine whether the nexus
requirement had been satisfied.6 1 This means that the court did not
use the "compelling evidence test," but reviewed the finding of the
lower court under de novo review, which is less deferential.
U.S. circuit courts are split on how to approach these
situations. It seems for some courts that not knowing the identity of
an attacker is an insurmountable problem, as there is no way for
them to definitively prove the motives of their attackers. Other
courts, like the Ninth Circuit, take all of the evidence together in
determining whether the nexus requirement is satisfied, even if the
58 Id. at 1378.
59 id.
60 Id. at 1380.
61 id.
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identity of the attacker is not known. Furthermore, the fact that
courts may be operating under different standards of review for
similar findings of the immigration judge, which may restrict the
courts' analysis in different ways, complicates matters further. Which
is the right approach? Fortunately, there are other sources of
interpretation that may be considered. As U.S. Asylum law is based
on the Convention, international sources may prove particularly
instructive.
IV. PROVING THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT: INTERPRETING U.S. ASYLUM
LAW IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
A. International Sources of Interpretation
When interpreting U.S. Asylum law, one cannot ignore the
international context in which it arose. The language used to define a
refugee under INA § 101(a)(42), with some additions and small
changes, comes directly from the language of the 1951 Convention.
Elizabeth A. James writes, "U.S. Asylum Law is derived from the
1951 Convention, the substantive provisions of which were included
in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. After
becoming a party to the Protocol in 1968, the United States became
bound by the doctrines concerning protection of refugees ....
Carly Marcs notes that "[i]n addition to interpretation of the
convention proper, there is increasing recognition that a thorough
analysis and application of the Convention must also take into
account the U.N. High Commission for Refugees Handbook and
63guidelines" (Handbook). The Supreme Court in Ins v. Cardoza
Fonseca cited the Handbook for guidance on how the burden of proof
should be interpreted, stating that while the Handbook does not have
force of law, "[n]onetheless, the Handbook provides significant
guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to
conform. It has been widely considered useful in giving content to
the obligations that the Protocol establishes."
64
62 James, supra note 3, at 476 (citations omitted).
63 Carly Marcs, Spoiling Movi's River: Towards Recognition of Perseccutory
Environmental Harm Within the Meaning of the Refugee Convention, 24 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 31,40 (2008).
64 480 U.S. 421,439 n. 22. (1987).
V. 18
WHY Do YOU PERSECUTE ME?
Furthermore, case law from other countries that are also
party to the Convention may shed light on how others have
interpreted similar laws. As with the Handbook, these sources are
not binding, but where there is no consensus among U.S. courts, one
may look to international sources as persuasive sources of
interpretation.
B. General Conditions of Violence: A Positive or Negative Factor?
How do "general conditions of violence and criminal acti-
vity" factor into the assessment of an applicant's burden of proof?
According to the Handbook, "persons compelled to leave their
country of origin as a result of international or national armed con-
flicts are not normally considered refugees under the 1951 Con-
vention or 1967 Protocol."6 5 What this means for civil war victims has
been interpreted differently in different countries, but it is generally
agreed that civil war crimes are a special case. 6 6 However, in the
cases discussed above, none of the applicants claimed that they were
victims of general violence. In these cases the applicants properly
alleged that persecution was on account of a protected ground. But
what effect do "general conditions of violence" in the country have
on the applicant's burden of proof? Should this fact make it harder
for applicants, or should it make it easier?
The court in Silva found it significant that the "Colombian
Country Report and the Country Profile are replete with descriptions
of widespread and indiscriminate violence" and that "Colombians
routinely suffer similar incidents of terroristic threats and violence,"
and that therefore her situation was not sufficiently distinct to set her
67apart for refugee status. The reasoning behind this view seems to be
that if there is much "indiscriminate violence" in a country, the
greater the chances that any specific act of persecution is not on
account of one of the grounds protected under the Convention.68 This
65 Handbook, supra note 4, para. 164.
66 See generally Hugo Storey and Rebecca Wallace, Note and Comment: War and
Peace in Refugee Law Jurisprudence, 95 A.J.I.L. 349, 349 (2001).
67 448 F.3d at 1238.
68 Id. at 1242. ("[1]f four out of every ten murders are on account of a protected
ground, six out often are not. The majority of the violence in Colombia is not related
to protected activity. When an individual seeking asylum based on persecution does
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view suggests that if the country conditions were more peaceful, and
such acts of violence were less common, it would be easier for an
applicant to prove that the persecution was on account of one of the
protected grounds.
Does it make sense to require a higher burden of proof from
applicants who come from countries where violence is common?
When there are general conditions of violence in a country, it may be
difficult for victims to identify who is behind particular acts of
persecution. In 1999, a New Zealand court heard the case of a man
seeking refugee status from the civil war-torn Sri Lanka, where
abuses are committed in such countries not just by the state,
but also by other groups and individuals who may
have no connection with either the state or any of the
warring factions. Very often the reasons for the com-
mission of the human rights abuses will be mixed. As
far as the victims, or potential victims of the abuses
are concerned, the identity of the agent of persecution
69and the reasons for the persecution matter little.
But the reasons for persecution matter very much for the purposes of
asylum law. Nevertheless, in the context of cases like Silva, Sepulveda,
Aguilera-Cota, and others, it is unreasonable to require the applicant
to conclusively prove what the reason for the persecution was,
especially where it is impossible for the applicant to do so. If the
evidence creates a strong inference that that the persecution was on
account of a protected ground, but it is impossible for the applicant to
prove this conclusively, the nexus requirement should be satisfied.
The Handbook notes,
The competent authorities that are called upon to
determine refugee status are not required to pass
judgment on conditions in the applicant's country of
not know either the identity of the alleged persecutors or the reason for the
persecution, the prevalence of random violent activity in Colombia, totally unrelated
to any protected ground, allows a reasonable inference that the individual seeking
asylum is the victim, not of political persecution, but of random violence.").
69 Refugee Appeal No 71462/99, para 30, quoted in Story & Wallace, supra note 66.
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origin. The applicant's statements cannot, however,
be considered in the abstract, and must be viewed in
the context of the relevant background situation. A
knowledge of conditions in the applicant's country of
origin while not a primary objective is an important
element in assessing the applicant's credibility.
These comments address the issue of credibility, an issue not in
dispute in Silva, Sepulveda, and Garces. The Handbook suggests that
just because the conditions of the alien's country of origin may not
seem intolerable, the alien should not be precluded from establishing
that her fear is well founded .7
Silva had the opposite problem as the one addressed in the
Handbook. The country conditions presented no issue of credibility,
since her testimony was consistent with the country conditions. Her
problem is essentially that her experiences were too consistent with
the country conditions, making it harder for her to prove that she was
singled out on account of her political opinion. However, such use of
country conditions was never contemplated by the Convention or the
Handbook. Although the Handbook does indeed stress that violent
country conditions is not necessarily enough to prove persecution on
a protected ground, nowhere does it suggest that violent conditions
should in any way make it harder for an applicant to prove the nexus
requirement. Violent country conditions should not be used against
the applicant, as it was in Silva, but should on the contrary serve only
to bolster the applicant's credibility, and support her contention that
her fear is well-founded. In contrast to the approach taken by the
Eleventh and Third Circuits, the Handbook suggests that such
general conditions of violence actually work in the applicant's favor
in determining a well-founded fear, making fear of persecution more
reasonable as far as the applicant is concerned.
70 Handbook, supra note 4, para. 42.
71 id.
72 Id. para. 164.
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C. Well-Founded Fear: Country Conditions and Its Effect on the
Subjective State of Mind
Even if it is impossible for an applicant to prove definitively
past persecution based on one of the five grounds, can the applicant
show a well-founded fear of future persecution? 13 As the BIA articu-
lated in Matter of Mogharrabi, "an applicant for asylum has
established a well-founded fear if he shows that a reasonable person
in his circumstances would fear persecution." 4 The Supreme Court
in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca stated that this standard does not require a
showing that the applicant would more likely than not be persecuted,
noting that the burden of proof for asylum is more generous than the
standard for withholding of removal .
The Handbook analyses the phrase "well-founded fear" in
terms of a subjective and an objective components: "fear" is the
subjective state of mind, to which the phrase "well-founded" adds an
objective element.16 The Handbook states, "Since fear is subjective,
the definition involves a subjective element in the person applying
for recognition as a refugee. Determination of refugee status will
therefore primarily require an evaluation of the applicant's state-
ments rather than a judgment on the situation prevailing in his
country of origin.
77
In defining the term "persecution," the Handbook explains
how the subjective state of mind can be affected by a country's
conditions:
"[A]n applicant may have been subjected to various
measures not in themselves amounting to persecution
(e.g. discrimination in different forms), in some cases
73 For purposes of the Convention, past persecution is simply a relevant factor
tending to establish a well-founded fear. Id. para 41. Under U.S. asylum law, an
applicant may be granted asylum under INA § 101(a) for either past persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution. 8 C.F.R. 208.13(b)(1) (2010)
74 Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
7'480 U.S. 421 (1987).
76 Handbook, supra note 4, para. 38.
77 Id para. 37; see also id. para. 52 ("The subjective character of fear of persecution
requires an evaluation of the opinions and feelings of the person concerned. It is also
the light of such opinions and feelings that any actual or anticipated measures
against him must necessarily be viewed.").
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combined with other adverse factors (e.g. general
atmosphere of insecurity in the country of origin). In
such situations, the various elements involved may, if
taken together, produce an effect on the mind of the
applicant that can reasonably justify a claim to well-
founded fear of persecution on 'cumulative
grounds'."7 8
Although the Handbook is not binding on U.S. courts, some
jurisdictions recognize persecution on "cumulative grounds." The
Ninth Circuit granted such an asylum application in Krotova v.
Gonzalez, stating that "[w]e need not decide whether any one of those
[instances of discrimination[, rises to the level of persecution, because
their cumulative effect persuades us that a finding of past
persecution is compelled." 79 The Third Circuit, however, declined to
address this issue in Toen Lik Tan v. AG of the United States when the
applicant claimed that the Immigration Judge failed to consider the
"cumulative harm" theory set forth in the Handbook, holding that
"[tihe UNHCR Handbook... 'is not binding on the INS or American
courts,'" and thus there was no legal issue.80 Whether the "cumulitive
harm theory" is accepted or not, however, according to the
Handbook, a "general atmosphere of insecurity in the country of
origin" works in the favor of the applicant, making it more reason-
able for an applicant to fear persecution.
In cases such as Silva, Sepulveda, Skendaj, Aguilera-Cota, and
the others outlined above, the problem is not that they have not
experienced anything that rises to the level of persecution, but that
the only event that does rise to the level of persecution (e.g., shooting,
bombing, kidpnapping attempt, etc.) cannot conclusively be linked
with all the other acts of discrimination which are on account of a
protected ground. However, considering all of the facts together, the
78Id. para. 53.
79416 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th
Cir. 1998) ("The key question is whether, looking at the cumulative effect of all the
incidents Petitioner has suffered, the treatment she received rises to the level of
persecution.").
" 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7865, **8 (3d Cir. Apr. 5, 2007) (citing Abdulai v.
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001)).
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aggregate effect of the evidence raises a strong inference of past
persecution on a protected ground. Even if this cannot be proved as
past persecution on a protected ground, it certainly will "produce an
effect on the mind of the applicant that can reasonably justify a claim
to well-founded fear of persecution." 81 Judge Carnes in his dissent in
Silva stated,
[Tihe majority opinion is willing only to assume that
being shot at is persecution. I would be so bold as to
hold that it is, especially when the attempted murder
is preceded by a written threat to kill the victim
because of her political activities and by an almost
daily barrage of threatening phone calls at her home
and restaurant.
82
In cases like Silva and Sepulvea, it is unreasonable to require proof
that is impossible for the applicant to produce, where there is such a
strong inference that the applicant will be persecuted on the basis of a
protected ground.
It must be remembered that "past persecution" is not
required in order to prove the nexus requirement, but a "well-
founded fear" of persecution. Congress added the provision con-
cerning past persecution to make it easier for those applicants who
have already experienced persecution: such past persecution merely
creates a presumption of a well-founded fear.83 But one must not lose
sight of the fact that a well-founded fear is all that is required. It
appears, in the cases discussed above, that the immigration judges
lost sight of the actual requirement, and denied the claims because
the applicants could not prove past persecution on account of a
protected ground definitively. Regardless of whether these findings
are correct, the events that transpired in Silva, Sepulveda, and Skedaj
would have created a well-founded fear in the applicants of persecu-
tion on account of political opinion.
8! Handbook, supra note 4, para. 53.
82 448 F.3d 1229, 1246 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
83 8 C.F.R. 208.13(b)(1) (2010); see also Aliaskari, supra note 8.
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D. The Burden of Proof Circumstantial Evidence and "The Benefit of
the Doubt"
An applicant's ability to show the nexus requirement is
heavily dependent on the burden of proof. Under U.S. Asylum law,
"[t]he burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the appli-
cant is a refugee, within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A)."1 4 This
principle is consistent with the Convention, as the Handbook similar-
ly states that "[i]t is a general legal principle that the burden of proof
lies in the person submitting the claim."8 5 However, the Handbook
further explains what is meant by this burden of proof, stating that
"while the burden of proof rests on the applicant, the duty to ascer-
tain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the
applicant and the examiner."86 Furthermore, the Handbook states
that "it is hardly possible for a refugee to 'prove' every part of his
case and, indeed, if this were a requirement the majority of refugees
would not be recognized. It is therefore frequently necessary to give
the applicant the benefit of the doubt."87 The Handbook requires a
finder of fact to draw an inference in favor of the applicant in some
cases where the applicant cannot definitely prove the case, assuming
the applicant is found to be credible.88
The U.S. Supreme Court articulated a similar standard in INS
v. Elias-Zacarias.8 9 In that case, the applicant claimed political perse-
cution because a guerilla group tried to coerce him into joining their
armed forces. The Court stated,
Elias-Zacarias objects that he cannot be expected to
provide direct proof of his persecutors' motives. We
do not require that. But since the statute makes
84 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
85 Handbook, suipra note 4, para. 195.
86Id. para. 196.
87 Id. para. 203; see also id. para. 197 ("The requirement of evidence should thus not
be too strictly applied in view of the difficulty of proof inherent in the special
situation in which an applicant for refugee status finds himself. Allowance for such
possible lack of evidence does not, however, mean that unsupported statements must
necessarily be accepted as true if they are inconsistent with the general account put
forward by the applicant.").
"Id. para. 204.
89 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
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motive critical, he must provide some evidence of it,
direct or circumstantial. And if he seeks to obtain
judicial reversal of the BIA's determination, he must
show that the evidence he presented was so com-
pelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find
the requisite fear of persecution.9"
Although the asylum application was denied, the Court did allow for
the fact that asylum applicants may not be able to know the true
motives of their persecutors, and that circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient.
Silva most likely falls within that category of cases contem-
plated by the Handbook, where although the applicant cannot prove
every part of her case, the fact finder should make an inference in her
favor. The Handbook's interpretation of the phrase "on account of"
one of the five protected grounds is particularly instructive: "Often
the applicant himself may not be aware of the reasons for the
persecution feared. It is not, however, his duty to analyze his case to
such an extent as to identify the reasons in detail."9 1 One of the
reasons why the Majority in Silva affirmed the denial of asylum was
that her testimony did not explicitly connect the shooting and the
anonymous phone calls with the "condolence note," although her
application for asylum did.92 However, since it is the court's duty to
analyze the specific reasons for the incidents in detail, since both
Silva's testimony and her application were found to be credible, the
court should have arrived at this conclusion itself. Silva had the
burden to produce the evidence, but the court has a duty to analyze it
properly.
The Ninth Circuit in Karouni v. Gonzalez stated, "'asylum
applicants [do not] bear ... the unreasonable burden of establishing
the exact motives of their persecutors .... .' '[A] persecutor's identity
90 Id. at 483-84.91 Handbook, supra note 4, para. 66.
92 "Silva ... wrote allegations in her application for asylum that, without more,
supported her inference of persecution on account of her political opinion, but when
Silva later testified credibly and in greater detail about those facts, at her asylum
hearing, she provided ample grounds for finding that she had not suffered
persecution based on her political opinion." 448 F.3d at 1240.
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and/or motivation may be established by direct or circumstantial
evidence." 93 Silva had much circumstantial evidence raising a strong
inference that the shooting was on account of political opinion.
Although she had no direct evidence, this should not have been
required under the standard articulated in Elias-Zacarias. It appears
that the immigration judge in Silva was not following the standard
articulated in the Handbook and confirmed in Elias-Zacarias, which
does not require definitive proof of an attackers motive in order to
satisfy the nexus requirement.
Whether or not the immigration judges followed this stan-
dard, the situation is complicated on appeal, however, where courts
must give deference to the Immigration Judge's findings of fact. The
majority in Silva stated that "[wie are required to view all of this
evidence in the light most favorable to the finding of the Immigration
Judge .... and in that light, we cannot say that the shooting was
indisputably related to Silva's political activity." 94 But is a finding of
whether persecution was on account of a protected ground purely an
issue of fact, or are there legal issues involved as well? The following
section discusses whether there may be a better way to review an
Immigration Judge's determination of the nexus requirement.
E. "On Account of" Political Opinion: Issue of Law or Issue of Fact?
When an Immigration Judge wrongly decides a case based on
an incorrect determination of the nexus requirement, there are two
ways to reverse the judgment. First, it may reverse and find that the
lower court's determination of the "on account of" nexus is erroneous
as a matter of fact, using the "substantial evidence test." Under this
highly deferential test, the circuit court cannot revise a finding of fact
unless the record compels a reversal: "the mere fact that the record
may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal
93 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005). In this case, the applicant was a a homosexual from
Lebanon, whose homosexual cousin was shot in the anus and killed by Hizballah. Id.
at 1167-68. The immigration Judge denied the application because the applicant
could not conclusively prove the motives of the murderers. Id. at 1169. The Ninth
reversed and held that did have a well founded fear of persecution because of
membership in a particular social group because shooting the victim in the anus was
an "obvious sign" of the persecutors' motive. Id. at 1174.
94 448 F.3d 1229, 1238 (11th Cir. 2006).
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of the administrative findings."95 Second, a reviewing court may
conclude that the evidence produced by an asylum applicant was so
compelling that the lower court must have applied the wrong test in
denying the claim, and erred as a matter of law. Issues of law are
reviewed de novo, a standard that does not give any deference to the
lower court's findings. The standard of review under which these
cases operates critically affects the analyses.
The Supreme Court assumed in Elias-Zacarias that a review of
a BIA's determination of the nexus requirement was an issue of fact
that could only be overturned by compelling evidence. 96 The
Eleventh Circuit in Silva stated a similar view. Consequently, the
court reviewed the Immigration Judge's determination under the
highly deferential "substantial evidence test":
[A]lthough the timing of the shooting would allow an
inference that it was related to the "condolence note,"
the record does not compel that conclusion .... We
are required to view all of this evidence in the light
most favorable to the findings of the Immigration
Judge, . . . and in that light, we cannot say the
shooting was indisputably related to Silva's political
activity.
97
A survey of other cases reveals that courts often consider this issue as
one of fact. The First Circuit stated in Hincaipe v. Attorney General that
"the question of whether persecution is on account of one of the five
statutorily protected grounds is fact-specific. Consequently, we
review the BIA's answer to that question through the prism of the
substantial evidence rule." 98 Even the Ninth Circuit stated in Jahed v.
INS, "Whether persecution is 'on account of' a petitioner's political
95 Silva v. Attorney General, 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11 th Cir. 2006) (citing Adefemi v.
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 544 U.S.
1035 (2005)).
96 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992).
9' 448 F.3d at 1238 (citations omitted).98 494 F.3d 213, 218 (lst Cir. 2007).
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opinion is a question of fact; it turns on evidence about the
"199persecutor's motives.
However, is there a legal issue here as well? Does a deter-
mination of whether persecution is on account of a protected ground
involve an interpretation of law in addition to an interpretation of
fact? Factually, either a persecutor was or was not politically
motivated, therefore it makes sense to classify this issue as an issue of
fact. But the issue in these cases can also be framed thus: what do
courts require of an applicant to show that persecution is on account
of a protected grounds? Specifically, what is the legal standard that
courts should apply in determining whether an applicant has met its
burden in showing that persecution was politically motivated? If the
issue is framed this way, then there is a legal issue which courts
should review de novo. In some cases, it may be more appropriate to
review a finding of the nexus requirement this way. Several cases
illustrate that this issue can be treated as a matter of law in some
cases.
If a court applies an incorrect test in determining whether
persecution was on account of a protected class, such error is an error
of law. Although the Ninth Circuit treated a determination of the
nexus requirement as an issue of fact in Jahed, the same court in
Aguilera-Cota treated it as an issue of law]00 In Agulera-Cota, as noted
above, the immigration Judge found that the applicant had not met
his burden to show a well founded fear of persecution "on account
of" his political opinion, because he did not know the identity of the
person who wrote the threatening note or came to his house.'0' The
Ninth Circuit characterized this determination as an issue of law:
The second significant legal error was the use by the
BIA and the IJ of an improper standard in evaluating
Aguilera's testimony. As a result, they failed to give
the proper weight to testimony essential to his case. A
review of the IJ's decision reveals that in assessing
whether Aguilera met the objective component of the
99 356 F.3d 991, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004).
100 914 F.2d at 1380. Judge Trott, who wrote the opinion in Jahed, joined the
majority opinion in Aguilera-Cota.
101 Id.
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well-founded fear test, the IJ imposed a far more
stringent burden on petitioner than we deemed per-
missible in Cardoza-Fonseca and Bolanos-Hernandez.
This error materially affected the outcome of the
proceedings. 102
The court could have reversed by finding that the evidence as a
matter of fact compelled a reversal, but instead the court made a
point of noting that "[qjuestions of law, such as whether the BIA
applied the appropriate legal standard, are reviewed de novo." 
103
Similarly, Manghesha v. Gonzalez, the Fourth Circuit reversed
an Immigration Judge's ruling that Manghesha, an Ethipian asylum
applicant did not qualify as a refugee because the persecution was
not on account of a protected ground. °4 Manghesha worked for the
government security services and was supposed to "spy on meetings
of groups opposed to the government," 105 but when he expressed
concern over the government's violent treatment of arrested indivi-
duals, the government accused him of being in sympathy with the
groups, warned him not to criticize the government or else he would
be harmed, and threatened him with arrest. °6 After failing to report
on the groups and even thwarting the efforts of the government to
arrest members of the groups, he fled the country and applied for
asylum in the U.S. °7 The Immigration Judge held that there was
insufficient evidence that the persecution he feared from the Ethio-
pian government would be on account of political opinion, because
the government would prosecute him rather "for his criminal act of
obstruction of justice." °" In reviewing this decision, the Fourth
Circuit treated this finding as a matter of law, stating that the
Immigration Judge applied an incorrect legal standard: the court
should not have required the applicant to show that prosecution
would be solely motivated by political opinion, but instead should
102 id.
103 Id. at 1378.
104 450 F.3d 142, 146 (4th Cir. 2006).
105 Id. at 144
106 Id. at 145.
107 id.
"Id. at 146.
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only have required the applicant to show "that the alleged persecutor
is motivated in part to persecute him on account of a protected
trait." 109 The Fourth Circuit stated:
In denying Menghesha's request for asylum, the IJ
committed legal, if not factual, error. In this respect,
this case must be distinguished from the many
instances in which we have considered whether the
BIA's factual findings justified a denial of asylum. We
resolved those cases under the extremely deferential
standard of review applicable to factual determina-
tions. In this instance, however, we are concerned
with the IJ's legal conclusions, not factual findings.
We find that the IJ erred as a matter of law in holding
Menghesha to an overly stringent legal standard:
proving that political persecution was the govern-
ment's sole motive.
110
Thus, the Immigration's decision was reviewed de novo, and the case
was remanded.
The Fourth Circuit, in reversing the Immigration Judge's
finding, was concerned that the Immigration Judge had rejected the
"mixed motive test," which does not require the applicant to show
that persecution was solely on account of one of the protected
grounds. The Immigration Judge did not explicitly reject the "mixed
motive" test, yet the Fourth Circuit majority, as the Ninth Circuit
held in Aguilera-Cota, concluded that it must have been using a
wrong test based on how stringent the Immigration Judge was.
Under the correct test, the evidence produced by the applicant
should have been sufficient to grant refugee status. The dissent in
Manghesha argued that this was "a typical fact-driven asylum case,
where the IJ's factual determinations should be given great defer-
ence.""' However, the dissenting judge acknowledged that if the
lower court indeed applied an incorrect legal standard, it should be
1'9 Id. at 148
I0 ld. at 147 (citations omitted)
Id. at 149 (Williams, J., dissenting)
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reviewed de novo, although he disagreed that the Immigration Judge
actually applied the incorrect standard. "12
Other countries also party to the Convention face similar
problems in interpreting the protected grounds under the Conven-
tion. The Australian Federal Magistrate Court reviews decisions by
the Refugee Review Tribunal, and in Szasb v Minister for Immigration
& Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, 1 3 dismissed an application for
judicial review of the Tribunal's decision that the applicant was not
persecuted on account of political opinion. The applicant claimed that
the Magistrate judge "erred in law" in finding that the persecution
was not on account of political opinion. 1 4 However, the Federal
Court of Australia, reviewing the Magistrate's dismissal, stated that
the appellant failed to establish he was entitled to a
protection visa because of findings of fact made by
the Tribunal concerning whether any harm he might
suffer on returning to Bangladesh was related to
actual or imputed political opinion. Quite correctly,
the Federal Magistrate indicated that issues of fact
were for the Tribunal to determine and it was not
bound to investigate by further inquiry, claims or
matters raised by the appellant. 115
Similarly, in Szans v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &
Indigenous Affairs, the Federal Magistrate Court of Australia reversed
a Tribunal decision denying asylum because a heterosexual marriage
forced on a homosexual in Bangladesh was not considered persecu-
,. 116
tion under the convention. On appeal to the Federal Court of
112 "Where I part ways with the majority, however, is with its unsupported statement
that the IJ required Menghesha to show that the government planned to persecute
Menghesha based solely on his political opinion.The i's oral opinion never stated
that Menghesha must show that he fears persecution based solely on his political
opinion. The IJ never stated that he was rejecting Menghesha's mixed motive
argument as a matter of law." Id. (Williams, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
... [2004] FCA 1420 (3 November 2004).
114 Id. at [16].
.5Id. at [18].
116 [2005] FCAFC 41 at [27] (17 March 2005). The issue of what is considered
"persecution" under the Convention, although a different issue than whether the
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Australia, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indi-
genous Affairs argued that "whether a forced heterosexual relation-
ship would constitute serious harm was a question of fact for the
[Tribunal], and not a matter for the federal magistrate to deter-
mine."" 7 The Federal Court of Australia held
Where the question is whether the material which
was before the tribunal reasonably admits of different
conclusions as to whether it falls within the ordinary
meaning of a statute, the question is one of fact. Here,
the question of whether the consequences of a homo-
sexual being forced to participate in a heterosexual
marriage constituted "serious harm" for the purposes
of the Convention, was plainly a question of fact, or of
mixed fact and law, within the test stated in the
authorities.118
However, this issue is not "plainly" a question of fact if it may be an
issue of mixed fact and law. The distinction between an issue of fact
and an issue of law is not necessarily clear.
Just as in Aguilera-Cota and Menghesha, there is a legal issue
embedded in the court's determination of the nexus requirement in
cases like Sepulveda, Silva, and Skendaj. The legal issue concerns how
much the applicant should be required to show in order to prove
political motivation. The question of whether an applicant was
persecuted on account of political opinion is, at the very least, a
mixed issue of fact and law. For instance, the events recounted by the
applicant in Silva, that she was shot at, that she received threatening
messages, and that the messages referenced the shooting and her
participation in "health brigades" are pure issues of fact. But
whether, on the whole, all of these facts are sufficient to satisfy the
nexus requirement to show that she was persecuted "on account of
political opinion" requires an interpretation of fact and law. If an
persecution was "on account of' a protected ground, is similar in that it presents the
same problem of an issue of law embedded in an issue of fact. Cf Garces, No. 04-
70272, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4842 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009).
117 [2005] FCAFC 41 at [50] (17 March 2005).
11' Id. at [51]-[52] (citations omitted).
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Immigration judge imposes too high a standard on applicants to
prove the nexus requirement, then there is an error of law. 19 In Silva,
Sepulveda, and Skendaj, as in Aguilera-Cota and Menghesha, the court
did not actually articulate an erroneous legal standard. The only
indication of an error of law in these cases was that that the evidence
produced by the applicants should have been sufficient to satisfy the
nexus requirement under the correct legal standard, and yet the
Immigration Judge still denied the claim. Yet, as shown by the Ninth
Circuit in Aguilera-Cota and the Fourth Circuit in Menghesha, this may
be enough to show that in incorrect legal standard was used.
One way in which the immigration judges may have used an
incorrect legal standard in Silva, Sepulveda, and the others is in
seeming to require proof of past persecution. Just as the Immigration
Judge in Manghesha did not take into account the fact that a
persecutor need not be solely motivated by political opinion, so the
Immigration Judge in Silva and Sepulveda lost sight of the fact that
past persecution is not required. The proper legal standard takes into
account all events and what effect they have on the applicants mind.
Sequences of events that produce a strong inference of political
persecution, even if there is no definitive proof of past persecution,
may give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution. Such was the
case in Silva, Sepulveda, and Skendaj, and to ignore this is to wrongly
apply the law.
As the dissenting opinion in Mengesha noted, "[tihe fact that
there are legal principles that govern these matters . . . does not
convert every question of fact or discretion into a question of law."
20
However, treating this issue as a question of fact prevents courts
from reviewing the legal questions that are implicated in this
determination, and immigration judge's legal determinations are
given the same deference on review as factual determinations.
One could argue, as Judge Carnes argued in his dissent in
Silva, that the facts of Silva's case compelled a reversal. This kind of
review is fact based, and uses the substantial evidence test. Alter-
natively, one could argue that the facts of her case were so com-
pelling that a denial of her application begs the question: can a victim
119 Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1990).
120 450 F.3d 142, 152 (9th Cir. 2006) (Williams, J., dissenting).
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of persecution ever satisfy the nexus requirement when she does not
know the identity of her attacker? Is there any circumstantial
evidence that could overcome the problem of an anonymous
persecutor? If courts frame the issue this way, the issue on review is a
legal question which is reviewed de novo.
V. CONCLUSION
No two asylum claims are exactly alike, and determination of
refugee status must be determined on a case-by-case basis. However,
the cases discussed here presented sufficiently similar questions of
law and fact to warrant inquiry as to why they were treated
differently. The Ninth Circuit approach in Aguilera-Cota is more
reasonable than that of the Eleventh Circuit as demonstrated in Silva
and Sepulveda, or the Third Circuit in Skendaj, because it does not
require evidence that cannot be obtained. Asylum applicants are
frequently not in a position to know all of the details of their
attacker's motives, but strong circumstantial evidence should be
enough to satisfy their burden of proof. Furthermore, even if it was
not possible for the applicants in these cases to prove that the
anonymous attacks were on account of political opinion, their fear of
persecution was well-founded. The chronology of events in these
cases creates a strong inference of past persecution and objectively
reasonable fear of future persecution on a protected ground.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit approach is more consistent
with the Protocol as interpreted by the Handbook. Although the
Handbook is not binding on U.S. courts, it is a valid and persuasive
source of interpretation. Especially since there is no unified approach
to this problem among the circuit courts, the interpretive framework
of the Handbook is particularly instructive on the proper inter-
pretation of the Protocol. The Handbook makes clear that where an
applicant is not in a position to know all of the facts, courts should
give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.
This article also calls into question the assumption that deter-
minations of the nexus requirement should always be analyzed
under the deferential "substantial evidence test." If an Immigration
Judge imposes too stringent a standard, especially where it is impos-
sible for an asylum applicant to definitively prove her case, there is
an issue of law that should be reviewed de novo. If claims such as
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Silva's, Sepulveda's, and Aguilera's are routinely denied, then it is
important that the reviewing courts ensure that the law is being
properly applied.
Finally, this article encourages the use of international
sources in interpreting US. asylum law. One cannot ignore the fact
that U.S. asylum law is based on the Convention, and that the U.S. is
party to the 1967 Protocol. In resolving the divergence of thought
among U.S. circuit courts, study of the Convention itself, along with
the Handbook, and even case law from other countries that are also
parties to the Convention, provides useful instruction.
